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Abstract	Automaticity	has	been	argued	to	be	a	core	feature	of	the	mental	processes	that	guide	social	interactions,	such	as	those	underpinning	imitative	behaviours.	To	date,	however,	there	is	little	known	about	the	automaticity	of	imitative	tendencies.	In	the	current	study,	we	used	a	finger	movement	stimulus-response	compatibility	task	to	index	processes	associated	with	controlling	the	urge	to	copy	other	people’s	actions.	In	addition,	we	manipulated	the	level	of	load	placed	on	a	secondary	cognitive	task	to	test	if	there	is	a	capacity	limit	in	the	systems	that	filter	distractor	finger	movement	stimuli.	Across	three	experiments,	we	showed	that	whether	letter	strings	(Exp.	1),	faces	(Exp.	2)	or	hand	postures	(Exp.	3)	are	held	in	working	memory,	there	was	no	impact	on	compatibility	effects	in	the	main	task.	These	findings	show	that	the	cognitive	operations	that	generate	imitative	tendencies	are	relatively	efficient	in	that	they	operate	the	same	whether	or	not	a	central	resource	is	taxed	heavily	with	non-social	(letter	strings)	or	social	stimuli	(faces	and	hand	postures).	Therefore,	in	the	sense	of	persisting	in	the	presence	of	a	demanding	cognitive	load	this	type	of	imitation	behaviour	can	be	considered	automatic.		
	
Keywords:	automaticity;	imitation;	cognitive	load;	stimulus-response	compatibility.		
Public	Significance	Statement	This	study	strongly	suggests	that	the	mental	processes	underpinning	imitative	behaviour	are	relatively	automatic,	such	that	they	are	unaffected	when	concurrently	performing	a	demanding	secondary	task.	
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Introduction	Unintentional	copying	of	others’	behaviour	has	been	argued	to	perform	key	social	functions	by	building	affiliation	and	rapport	between	interaction	partners	(Chartrand	&	Lakin,	2013;	Over	&	Carpenter,	2012).	Moreover,	it	is	claimed	that	fundamental	social	processes,	such	as	the	way	we	perceive	and	interact	with	others,	influence	each	other	in	a	relatively	rapid	and	unintended	fashion	(Dijksterhuis,	Bargh,	&	Mark,	2001;	Heyes,	2011).	Given	the	pivotal	role	that	automatic	forms	of	imitation	have	been	argued	to	play	in	everyday	life,	there	has	been	surprisingly	little	research	that	has	directly	examined	the	automaticity	of	imitative	tendencies.	Therefore,	the	current	paper	uses	a	dual-task	paradigm	to	investigate	one	dimension	of	automaticity	in	relation	to	imitation	–	the	extent	to	which	automatic	imitation	endures	under	high	cognitive	load.		 The	traditional	“two-systems”	division	between	automatic	and	controlled	processes	(Posner	&	Snyder,	1975;	Shiffrin	&	Schneider,	1977)	has	been	expanded	to	construe	automaticity	as	a	multi-dimensional	construct	(Bargh,	1989,	1994;	Melnikoff	&	Bargh,	2018;	Moors	&	De	Houwer,	2006).	Accordingly,	a	behaviour	or	effect	can	be	more	or	less	“automatic”	in	at	least	three	senses:	1)	it	can	be	unintentional	and,	for	example,	occur	without	instruction;	2)	it	can	be	stimulus-driven	and	resistant	to	top-down	control;	and	3)	it	can	be	efficient,	in	the	sense	of	persisting	under	concurrent	cognitive	load.	To	better	understand	the	cognitive	processes	underlying	automatic	imitation,	it	is	therefore	important	to	consider	the	extent	to	which	imitative	tendencies	are	“automatic”	with	reference	to	these	dimensions.		
	
Unintentional	imitation		 Evidence	that	automatic	imitation	is	unintentional	has	been	provided	by	developmental	(Over	&	Carpenter,	2012;	Ray	&	Heyes,	2011),	social	(Chartrand	&	Lakin,	
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2013)	and	cognitive	psychology	(Heyes,	2011).	For	example,	during	live	social	interactions,	adults	tend	to	copy	the	actions	of	a	confederate	without	any	instruction	to	do	so	(Chartrand	&	Bargh,	1999).	In	addition,	laboratory-based	measures	of	automatic	imitation	have	been	developed	using	stimulus	response	compatibility	(SRC)	paradigms	(Brass,	Bekkering,	Wohlschlager,	&	Prinz,	2000;	Kilner,	Paulignan,	&	Blakemore,	2003;	Stürmer,	Aschersleben,	&	Prinz,	2000).	The	SRC	measure	of	imitation	typically	involves	performing	simple	finger,	hand	or	arm	movements,	whilst	concurrently	observing	a	compatible	or	incompatible	action.	In	these	experiments	the	primary	task	is	independent	to	the	observed	body	movement.	Therefore,	in	the	sense	of	being	task-independent,	influences	of	the	observed	movement	on	behaviour	can	be	considered	“unintentional”.		To	elaborate,	in	one	version	of	the	task	participants	are	instructed	to	make	simple	finger	movements	in	response	to	a	number	‘1’	or	‘2’	(Brass	et	al.,	2000).	Despite	the	observed	finger	movement	being	task-irrelevant,	reaction	times	are	longer	and	performance	more	error-prone	during	incompatible	than	compatible	conditions,	with	the	difference	between	conditions	known	as	the	compatibility	effect.	Moreover,	compared	to	a	baseline	condition	where	the	observed	hand	is	static,	performance	is	facilitated	in	the	compatible	condition,	and	also	impaired	in	the	incompatible	condition	(Brass	et	al.,	2000).	Therefore,	such	SRC	measures	have	been	argued	to	index	processes	associated	with	the	unintentional	urge	to	copy	other	people’s	actions	(Brass	&	Heyes,	2005;	Brass,	Ruby,	&	Spengler,	2009;	Heyes,	2011).	In	sum,	evidence	to	date	suggests	that	imitative	behaviour	can	be	automatic	in	the	sense	that	it	is	unintentional.		
	
Top-down	influences	
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Other	research	using	SRC	measures	has	shown	that	automatic	imitation	is	not	completely	stimulus-driven	in	the	sense	that	it	can	be	modulated	by	participants’	knowledge	of	the	stimuli,	or	their	task	set.	Manipulating	viewers’	knowledge	or	beliefs	about	the	human	or	animate	nature	of	the	stimuli	influences	SRC	measures	(Gowen,	Bolton,	&	Poliakoff,	2016;	Klapper,	Ramsey,	Wigboldus,	&	Cross,	2014;	Liepelt	&	Brass;	Longo	&	Bertenthal,	2009;	Stanley,	Gowen	&	Miall,	2007).	For	example,	Klapper	and	colleagues	(2014)	found	that	the	size	of	the	compatibility	effect	evoked	by	the	same	movements	of	artificial,	computer-rendered	“fingers”	was	larger	when	participants	were	led	to	believe	that	these	movements	were	generated	by	motion-tracking	of	real	human	behaviour	as	compared	to	a	computer	algorithm.		Further,	task	instructions	that	vary	the	participants’	attentional	focus	on	action	cues	likewise	modulate	compatibility	effects	(Bach,	Peatfield,	&	Tipper,	2007;	Chong	Cunnington,	Williams,	&	Mattingley,	2009).	For	example,	Chong	and	colleagues	(2009)	found	that	directing	participants’	attention	to	a	task-relevant	stimulus	feature	that	spatially	overlapped	with	an	observed	hand	action,	or	to	the	chirality	of	the	hand	itself,	removed	compatibility	effects	on	response	times.	Findings	such	as	these	are	in	keeping	with	a	multi-dimensional	view	of	automaticity	(Melnikoff	&	Bargh,	2018),	by	showing	that	imitative	processes	can	exhibit	some	automatic	features	(unintentional),	as	well	as	some	controlled	features	(top-down	influences).	
	
Cognitive	Load	The	extent	to	which	imitation	is	automatic	in	terms	of	efficiency	of	processing	and	robustness	to	concurrent	perceptual	or	cognitive	load	is	less	clear.	In	this	context,	a	hallmark	of	automaticity	would	be	a	behaviour	or	process	that	would	not	depend	on	the	availability	of	a	central	cognitive	resource	and	that	could	occur	in	parallel	with	other	
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mental	processes.	Load	theory	provides	a	useful	framework	for	testing	automaticity	in	this	sense	(Lavie,	2005;	2010).	Load	theory	distinguishes	two	major	kinds	of	mental	load:	perceptual	load	and	cognitive	load.	Perceptual	load	refers	to	increasing	demand	on	sensory/perceptual	processes,	as	would	be	produced	by	the	addition	of	irrelevant	visual	or	auditory	stimuli	concurrent	to	a	primary	imperative	stimulus.	In	contrast,	cognitive	load	increases	the	demands	on	a	central,	general	process	such	as	working	memory.		Empirical	demonstrations	suggest	that	higher	perceptual	loads	tend	to	dilute	the	effects	of	a	given	distractor,	making	them	less	impactful	on	the	primary	task.	In	contrast,	higher	concurrent	cognitive	load	will	tend	to	increase	the	impact	of	distractor	events	on	a	primary	task	(Lavie,	Hirst,	De	Fockert,	&	Viding	,	2004).	The	interpretation	of	the	latter	load	effect	is	that	when	cognitive	control	resources	are	taxed	through	a	secondary	task,	those	same	resources	are	not	able	to	operate	as	effectively	in	filtering	the	influence	of	distracting	stimuli	on	the	primary	task.	For	either	kind	of	load	(perceptual	or	cognitive),	however,	the	absence	of	sensitivity	to	variation	in	load	can	be	taken	as	an	indicator	of	automaticity.	In	the	present	context,	we	can	ask	how	behavioural	measures	of	the	tendency	to	imitate	are	influenced	by	concurrent	load.	To	the	extent	that	these	effects	resist	effective	load	manipulations,	the	underlying	processes	associated	with	imitation	can	be	said	to	be	“automatic”	in	the	third	sense	outlined	above	(i.e.,	persisting	in	a	relatively	unaffected	manner	in	the	presence	of	concurrent	load).		To	date,	two	previous	studies	have	assessed	the	impact	of	load	on	SRC	measures	of	imitation	and	the	findings	have	been	inconclusive.	Catmur	(2016)	manipulated	perceptual	load	by	adding	letter	strings	(including	1,	2,	4	or	6	items)	to	the	basic	SRC	paradigm	(Brass	et	al.,	2000).	With	increasing	perceptual	load	(increasing	numbers	of	letters)	the	compatibility	effect	reversed,	such	that	compatible	trials	produced	longer	reaction	times	than	incompatible	trials.	Although	such	findings	demonstrate	that	
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observed	finger	movements	are	processed	at	high	perceptual	load,	the	results	are	difficult	to	reconcile	with	both	our	current	understanding	of	load	and	of	imitation	effects.	One	feature	of	this	approach	in	general	is	that	perceptual	load	effects	may	be	complicated	by	low-level	visual	interference	or	interactions	between	simultaneously-presented	stimuli	(Benoni,	2018),	such	as	letters	and	hand	images	in	the	case	of	Catmur	(2016).	As	such,	a	clear	picture	has	not	yet	emerged	regarding	the	influence	of	perceptual	load	on	imitation.		In	contrast,	Van	Leeuwen	and	colleagues	(2009)	manipulated	cognitive	load	in	combination	with	an	SRC	measure	of	imitation.	Concurrent	to	the	SRC	task,	an	auditory	stream	of	letter	names	was	presented.	Participants	in	a	high-load	group	had	to	respond	when	the	letter	they	just	heard	was	identical	to	the	one	they	heard	two	trials	previously	(2-back).	In	comparison,	a	separate	low-load	group	of	participants	performed	an	easier,	immediate	target-detection	control	task	on	the	same	auditory	stream.	The	results	did	not	show	an	interaction	between	the	critical	variables	of	load	and	compatibility,	although	power	was	limited	by	the	use	of	a	between-participants	design.	As	such,	there	was	minimal	evidence	that	cognitive	load	influences	the	compatibility	effect,	which	suggests	that	imitative	tendencies	are	resistant	to	cognitive	load	manipulations.		The	aim	of	the	present	study	was	to	test	the	extent	to	which	a	demanding	secondary	task	influences	SRC	measures	of	automatic	imitation.	We	focussed	on	the	influence	of	a	central,	cognitive	load	in	part	to	remove	concerns	about	complicating	peripheral	effects	of	interactions	among	visual	elements	(Benoni,	2018).	Importantly,	clear	predictions	were	derived	from	load	theory	(Lavie,	2005;	2010).	If	there	is	an	efficiency	limit	on	the	processes	supporting	automatic	imitation,	then	increasing	the	concurrent	load	on	working	memory	should	increase	the	distracting	nature	of	the	irrelevant	finger	movements,	thus	producing	an	increased	congruency	effect.	In	
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contrast,	if	the	compatibility	effect	is	unaffected	in	the	presence	of	high	load,	this	would	suggest	that	the	tendency	to	imitate	other’s	movements,	at	least	as	captured	by	the	SRC	task,	is	relatively	automatic,	in	the	sense	of	persisting	in	the	face	of	a	demanding	cognitive	task.		
	
Experiment	1	
Introduction		In	the	first	experiment	we	built	on	previous	successful	manipulations	of	central	load	by	testing	working	memory	for	letter	arrays	(Konstantinou,	Beal,	King,	&	Lavie,	2014).	This	approach	means	there	is	little	overlap	of	perceptual	features	between	the	stimuli	driving	the	load	manipulation	(letters)	and	the	main	SRC	task	(finger	movements).	Accordingly,	if	this	procedure	did	reveal	an	effect	of	load	on	SRC,	it	would	be	attributable	to	demands	on	general	processes	that	operate	over	different	categories	of	items	from	different	domains.		
Method	Consistent	with	recent	proposals	(Simmons,	Nelson,	&	Simonsohn,	2011;	2012),	across	all	experiments,	we	report	how	we	determined	our	sample	size,	all	data	exclusions	(if	any),	all	manipulations,	and	all	measures	in	the	study.	In	addition,	following	open	science	initiatives	(Munafò	et	al.,	2017),	the	raw	data	are	freely	available	online	(osf.io/suzrp).	By	making	the	raw	data	available,	we	enable	others	to	pursue	tests	of	alternative	hypotheses,	as	well	as	more	exploratory	analyses.		 Across	all	experiments,	we	determined	our	sample	size	by	aiming	to	collect	data	for	50	usable	datasets.	For	Experiments	2	and	3,	we	also	pre-registered	this	stopping	
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rule	as	well	as	the	hypotheses	and	analysis	plan.	Based	on	our	target	sample	size,	we	performed	a	sensitivity	analysis	using	G*Power.	In	the	analyses	based	on	ANOVA,	a	sample	of	50	participants	would	provide	80%	power	to	detect	conventionally	large	effects	(partial	eta	squared,	h!" 	>	0.14).	In	the	analyses	based	on	one-tailed	paired	comparisons,	a	sample	of	50	participants	would	provide	80%	power	to	detect	conventionally	small	to	medium	effects	(Cohen’s	dz	>	0.35).	A	sample	size	of	50,	therefore,	provides	relatively	high	confidence	that	if	a	small	to	moderate	effect	of	load	should	exist,	we	would	be	able	to	detect	it	using	paired	comparisons	between	key	conditions.			
Participants	Fifty-nine	participants	took	part	in	this	experiment	for	monetary	compensation	or	course	credit.	All	participants	provided	informed	consent	and	had	normal	or	corrected-to-normal	vision.	Approval	was	obtained	from	the	Research	Ethics	and	Governance	Committee	of	the	School	of	Psychology	at	Bangor	University.	Participants	were	excluded	if	performance	was	2.5	standard	deviations	away	from	the	group	mean	average	performance	per	condition	in	terms	of	accuracy	on	the	working	memory	task	(N=1),	as	well	as	accuracy	(N=3)	or	reaction	time	(N=1)	on	the	SRC	task.	Additionally,	one	further	participant	completed	only	half	the	trials	and	withdrew	from	the	experiment	and	was	thus	excluded.	The	final	sample	included	53	participants	(14	males,	Meanage=21.45,	SDage=3.67,	age	range	=	18	to	38).	
	
Stimuli,	task,	and	procedure	Before	the	main	task,	participants	completed	one	practice	block	of	a	SRC	task	(32	trials),	a	working	memory	task	(32	trials)	and	the	main	task,	which	combined	the	SRC	
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and	working	memory	tasks	(32	trials).	This	practice	phase	was	followed	by	eight	blocks	of	the	main	task	(256	trials).	The	SRC	task	was	based	on	the	SRC	paradigm	developed	by	Brass	and	colleagues	(2000),	which	consisted	of	finger-lifting	movement	observation	and	execution.	The	hand	stimuli	comprised	an	image	of	a	female	hand	positioned	in	the	centre	of	the	screen	and	viewed	from	a	third	person	perspective	such	that	the	fingers	extended	towards	the	participants.	The	first	image	was	of	the	hand	in	a	neutral	position,	while	the	remaining	four	images	showed	either	an	index	or	middle	finger	lift	with	a	number	‘1’	or	‘2’	presented	between	the	index	and	middle	finger.	Participants	were	asked	to	hold	down	the	“m”	and	“n”	keys	on	the	keyboard	with	their	index	and	middle	fingers	of	the	right	hand,	respectively.	They	were	instructed	to	lift	their	index	finger	when	they	saw	a	number	“1”	and	their	middle	finger	when	they	saw	the	number	“2”.	Thus,	there	were	four	possible	trial	types,	two	of	which	were	compatible,	and	two	of	which	were	incompatible.	In	the	compatible	condition,	participants	were	cued	to	perform	the	same	finger-lifting	movement	that	they	observed	(i.e.	an	index	finger	movement	with	a	‘1’	or	a	middle	finger	movement	with	a	‘2’).	In	the	incompatible	condition,	the	executed	and	observed	movements	were	different	(i.e.	an	index	finger	movement	with	a	‘2’	or	a	middle	finger	movement	with	a	‘1’).		For	the	working	memory	task,	participants	were	presented	with	a	memory	set	consisting	of	one	(low	load	condition)	or	six	(high	load	condition)	letters	presented	in	a	circular	array	in	the	centre	of	the	screen.	The	letters	were	randomly	chosen	on	each	trial	from	the	set	[FHKLMTVWYX],	with	the	constraint	that	no	letters	were	duplicated	within	a	high	load	trial.	The	letters	were	presented	such	that	each	letter	occurred	with	equal	probability	in	any	of	the	six	positions	in	the	circular	array	(see	Konstantinou	et	al.,	2014	for	a	similar	manipulation	of	working	memory	load).	For	the	low	load	condition,	five	of	the	letters	were	replaced	by	circular	dots	in	the	array.	Participants	were	instructed	to	
 11 
remember	the	letter/s	presented	in	the	circular	array	throughout	the	retention	interval	because	they	would	be	asked	to	verify	whether	a	probe	letter,	which	was	presented	after	the	retention	interval,	was	present	in	the	initial	circular	array.	At	the	end	of	the	retention	interval,	participants	were	then	asked	to	verify	whether	a	probe	letter	was	present	(press	key	“e”)	or	absent	(press	key	“d”)	in	the	circular	array	of	letters	shown	at	the	start	of	the	trial.	For	half	of	the	trials	(present	trials),	the	probe	letter	was	drawn	from	those	that	had	appeared	in	the	array.	For	the	other	half	(absent	trials),	the	probe	letter	was	not	one	that	had	appeared	in	the	initial	array.	All	letters	in	both	the	“present”	and	“absent”	trials	came	from	the	same	overall	letter	set	[FHKLMTVWYX].	The	imitation	task	was	presented	during	the	retention	interval	of	the	working	memory	task	(Figure	1).	Participants	were	asked	to	press	down	on	the	“m”	and	“n”	keys	with	the	index	and	middle	fingers	of	their	right	hand,	and	keep	their	left	index	and	middle	fingers	on	the	“e”	and	“d”	keys	respectively.	Each	trial	started	with	six	dots	presented	in	a	circular	array	for	500	milliseconds.	The	memory	set	of	letters	(either	one	or	six)	was	then	presented	for	1000	milliseconds,	followed	by	a	central	fixation	dot	for	2000	milliseconds.	The	neutral	hand	stimulus	of	the	imitation	task	was	then	presented	on	the	screen	for	a	random	inter-stimulus	interval	of	500,	700,	or	1000	milliseconds,	followed	by	a	number	cue	and	finger	movement,	which	stayed	onscreen	until	a	response	or	for	a	maximum	of	2000	milliseconds.	Participants	had	to	lift	their	right-hand	index	or	middle	finger	depending	on	the	number	cue.	After	the	participant	responded	to	the	number	cue	in	the	SRC	task,	the	memory	probe	letter	was	then	presented.	Participants	then	had	to	press	either	the	“d”	or	“e”	key	with	their	left	hand	indicating	whether	the	letter	was	absent	or	present	respectively	in	the	memory	set	presented	earlier.	The	memory	probe	target	letter	stayed	on	screen	until	a	response	was	made	or	for	a	maximum	of	3000	milliseconds.	Each	trial	was	self-paced	and	participants	were	given	a	
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short	break	every	32	trials	in	the	main	task.	Thus,	there	were	four	trial	types	in	the	main	task,	formed	by	crossing	load	(low	or	high)	factorially	with	SRC	(compatible	or	incompatible).			
Data	analysis	Accuracy	on	the	working	memory	task	was	defined	as	the	proportion	of	trials	that	the	target	was	correctly	recognised	as	being	present	or	absent	from	the	initial	array	of	stimuli.	A	2	(Load:	low,	high)	x	2	(Compatibility:	compatible,	incompatible)	repeated	measures	ANOVA	was	performed	on	working	memory	accuracy	data.	A	main	effect	of	load	was	predicted	such	that	accuracy	would	be	lower	for	high	than	low	memory	loads.	Accuracy	on	the	SRC	task	was	defined	as	the	proportion	of	trials	where	the	correct	finger	was	lifted	in	response	to	the	number	cue.	In	addition,	reaction	time	on	the	SRC	task	was	defined	as	the	time	taken	between	the	appearance	of	the	number	cue	(the	imperative	stimulus)	and	the	response	of	the	participant.	To	make	sure	that	reaction	times	reflected	performance	on	compatible	versus	incompatible	trials,	and	in	line	with	typical	practice,	only	correct	trials	on	the	SRC	task	were	used	to	calculate	reaction	times.	For	both	accuracy	and	for	reaction	time	on	the	SRC	task,	a	2	(Load:	low,	high)	x	2	(Compatibility:	compatible,	incompatible)	repeated	measures	ANOVA	was	performed.		Based	on	prior	research	(reviewed	in	Heyes,	2011),	we	expected	a	main	effect	of	compatibility	for	accuracy	and	for	reaction	time,	such	that	the	incompatible	condition	would	be	slower	and	more	error-prone	than	the	compatible	condition.	To	support	the	hypothesis	that	processes	underpinning	automatic	imitation	are	influenced	by	cognitive	load,	a	Load	*	Compatibility	interaction	would	be	expected,	such	that	the	compatibility	effect	was	larger	under	high	than	low	load.	Since	the	size	of	the	interaction	effect	was	central	to	testing	our	primary	hypothesis,	we	also	estimated	compatibility	effects	for	
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low	and	high	load	conditions	separately	by	calculating	the	mean	difference	and	95%	confidence	interval	between	compatibility	conditions.	We	then	directly	estimated	the	size	of	the	difference	in	compatibility	effects	between	low	and	high	load	conditions	by	again	calculating	the	mean	difference	and	95%	confidence	interval.	We	used	one-tailed	95%	confidence	intervals	to	reflect	our	clear	directional	hypothesis	that	high	load	should	result	in	greater	SRC	effects	than	low	load.		We	report	effect	sizes	in	original	units	(e.g.	milliseconds)	using	mean	differences	between	conditions	and	95%	confidence	intervals.	Standardised	effect	sizes	were	also	calculated	for	ANOVA	using	partial	eta	squared	(h!")	and	for	paired	comparisons	using	Cohen’s	dz	(Cohen,	1992;	Lakens,	2013).	In	cases	where	a	null	result	was	found	using	null	hypothesis	significance	testing,	we	used	a	Bayesian	paired	samples	t-test	to	quantify	evidence	for	the	null	hypothesis	compared	to	the	experimental	hypothesis.	To	do	so,	a	Bayes	factor	(BF01)	was	calculated,	which	can	be	interpreted	as	evidence	for	the	null	hypothesis	compared	to	the	experimental	hypothesis,	given	the	data.	Benchmark	criteria	from	Jeffreys	(1961)	were	used	for	interpreting	Bayes	factors.	All	statistical	analyses	were	performed	using	JASP	(JASP	Team,	2018)	and	all	results	figures	were	produced	using	R	(R	Core	Team,	2018).		
Results	Data	for	Experiment	1	are	visualised	in	Figure	2	and	effect	sizes	for	key	compatibility	effects	are	reported	in	Table	1.			
Working	memory		 Accuracy.	On	average,	all	conditions	were	above	chance	performance	as	demonstrated	by	the	95%	confidence	intervals	not	including	50%	(Figure	2A).	
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Further,	a	2	(Load:	low,	high)	x	2	(Compatibility:	compatible,	incompatible)	repeated	measures	ANOVA	showed	a	significant	main	effect	of	load	F(1,52)=195.93,	p	<0.001,	h!" 	=	0.79,	which	had	an	effect	size	that	is	conventionally	considered	large	(Figure	2A).	There	was	no	significant	main	effect	of	compatibility	F(1,52)=0.20,	p	=0.66,	h!" 	<0.01	and	no	significant	interaction	between	Load	and	Compatibility	F(1,52)=0.03,	p=0.87,	h!" 	<0.01.	The	effect	sizes	for	the	main	effect	of	compatibility	and	the	two-way	interaction	were	close	to	zero.	The	main	effect	of	load	shows	that	participants	were	less	accurate	on	the	working	memory	task	in	the	high	load	than	low	load	condition	(Figure	2A).				
SRC	task		 Accuracy.	Average	accuracy	was	over	90%	in	all	conditions	(Figure	2B).	Further,	a	2	(Load:	low,	high)	x	2	(Compatibility:	compatible,	incompatible)	repeated	measures	ANOVA	showed	no	significant	main	effect	of	load	F(1,52)=0.08,	p=0.77,	h!" 	<0.01,	with	an	effect	size	close	to	zero.	There	was	a	significant	main	effect	of	compatibility	F(1,52)=50.74,	p<0.001,	h!" 	=	0.49,	but	no	significant	interaction	between	Load	and	Compatibility	F(1,52)=0.76,	p=0.39,	h!" 	=	0.01.	The	effect	size	for	the	main	effect	of	compatibility	is	conventionally	considered	large	and	the	effect	size	for	the	two-way	interaction	was	close	to	zero.	The	main	effect	of	compatibility	shows	that	participants	were	less	accurate	on	the	imitation	task	in	the	incompatible	condition	than	the	compatible	condition	(Figure	2B).			 Reaction	time.	A	2	(Load:	low,	high)	x	2	(Compatibility:	compatible,	incompatible)	repeated	measures	ANOVA	showed	no	significant	main	effect	of	load	F(1,52)=2.35,	p=0.13,	h!" 	=	0.04.	However,	there	was	a	trend	towards	high	load	leading	to	longer	RTs	in	general,	but	this	was	a	relatively	small	effect	size	(Figure	2C).	There	was	a	significant	
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main	effect	of	compatibility	F(1,52)=139.11,	p<0.001,	h!" 	=	0.73,	but	no	significant	interaction	between	Load	and	Compatibility	F(1,52)=0.69,	p=0.41,	h!" 	=	0.01.	The	effect	size	for	the	main	effect	of	compatibility	is	conventionally	considered	large	and	the	effect	size	for	the	two-way	interaction	was	close	to	zero.	The	main	effect	of	compatibility	shows	that	participants	were	slower	to	respond	in	the	incompatible	than	compatible	condition	(Figure	2C).	The	lack	of	interaction	shows	that	the	compatibility	effect	does	not	vary	between	load	conditions.		To	further	interrogate	our	key	hypothesis,	we	estimated	effect	sizes	for	the	primary	paired	comparisons	of	interest.	To	do	so,	we	calculated	the	compatibility	effect	for	high	and	low	load	conditions	separately	and	then	compared	them	to	each	other.	When	considered	separately,	average	compatibility	effects	were	large	(Cohen’s	dz	>	1.2)	and	the	lower	bound	of	the	95%	confidence	intervals	were	both	above	zero	for	low	load	and	high	load	conditions	(Figure	2C;	Table	1).	When	the	compatibility	effect	for	High	load	was	directly	compared	to	Low	load,	there	was	not	even	a	trend	for	a	difference	in	the	predicted	direction	dz	=	-0.11	(Figure	2C;	Table	1).	In	addition,	a	Bayesian	paired	samples	t-test	showed	that	the	null	was	11	times	more	likely	than	the	experimental	effect	(BF01	=	11.44).	In	sum,	both	low	and	high	load	conditions	have	a	non-zero	compatibility	effect,	but	the	compatibility	effect	does	not	differ	as	a	function	of	load.		
Discussion	The	results	demonstrate	a	clear	effect	of	central	load	on	working	memory	performance,	as	well	as	a	clear	compatibility	effect	in	the	SRC	task.	Both	of	these	findings	replicate	previous	work	and	demonstrate	that	the	manipulations	were	successful.	Importantly,	there	was	no	meaningful	influence	of	load	on	compatibility	effect.	The	findings,	therefore,	provide	initial	evidence	that	the	cognitive	processes	supporting	the	tendency	
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to	imitate	another	person’s	actions	operate	in	a	relatively	efficient	manner,	which	is	independent	of	central	cognitive	resources.	This	pattern	is	consistent	with	the	third	sense	of	automaticity	described	in	the	General	Introduction	(i.e.,	that	imitative	effects	persist	under	concurrent	cognitive	load).		There	are	two	limitations	to	this	initial	conclusion,	which	Experiment	2	addresses.	First,	the	version	of	the	automatic	imitation	paradigm	used	in	Experiment	1	combined	spatial	and	imitative	compatibility	features.	For	example,	in	an	incompatible	trial,	the	identity	of	the	observed	finger	movement	was	different	to	the	finger	movement	required	by	the	participant	(imitative	compatibility),	as	well	as	being	in	an	incongruent	spatial	location	relative	to	the	required	movement	on	the	left-right	axis	(spatial	compatibility).	As	such,	it	is	possible	that	load	effects	may	have	operated	differently	on	these	SRC	components	and	obscured	the	effects	of	interest.		Second,	based	on	theories	of	working	memory	structure	(Allen,	Baddeley,	&	Hitch,	2017;	Baddeley,	1992;	Baddeley	and	Hitch,	1974),	it	may	be	that	the	working	memory	subsystem(s)	supporting	the	encoding	of	letters	may	be	distinct	from	systems	involved	in	perceiving	the	finger	movements,	even	though	both	were	presented	in	the	visual	modality.	That	is,	storing	the	working	memory	stimuli	(letters)	may	have	depended	on	the	activity	of	a	phonological	buffer	–	although	given	the	brevity	of	the	presentation,	re-coding	the	letters	in	this	way	would	likely	prove	challenging.	The	finger-movement	displays	were,	by	definition,	not	intended	to	be	encoded	into	working	memory;	yet	their	perception	may,	if	anything,	have	a	relatively	stronger	influence	on	a	visuo-spatial	memory	system.	Previous	findings	from	the	load	theory	programme	are	not	fully	supportive	of	this	view,	however.	For	example,	manipulation	of	working	memory	load	(memory	for	digits)	influenced	both	behavioural	and	neural	measures	of	interference	from	face	images	on	a	name-categorisation	task	(de	Fockert,	Rees,	Frith,	&	
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Lavie,	2001).	Nonetheless,	these	considerations	highlight	that	the	absence	of	a	load	effect	could	in	principle	reflect	not	(or	not	only)	the	automaticity	of	imitation,	but	the	architecture	of	cognitive	systems	that	cope	with	distinct	kinds	of	information.				
Experiment	2	
Introduction	In	Experiment	2,	we	addressed	these	issues	by	making	two	principal	changes.	First,	we	disentangled	spatial	and	imitative	compatibility	effects	by	using	a	version	of	the	automatic	imitation	task	that	provides	separate	spatial	and	imitative	interference	measures	(Bertenthal,	Longo,	&	Kosobud,	2006;	Boyer,	Longo,	&	Bertenthal,	2012;	Catmur	&	Heyes,	2011).		Second,	we	used	face	stimuli	instead	of	letters	as	the	basis	for	a	load	manipulation.	Loading	working	memory	with	a	social	rather	than	a	verbal	stimulus	achieved	two	objectives.	It	increased	the	domain	overlap	between	the	load	stimuli	(faces)	and	the	primary	task	(finger	movements).	Furthermore,	compared	to	letters,	unfamiliar	and	highly	homogenous	computer-rendered	faces	are	much	more	difficult	to	subvocalise	or	verbalise.	In	both	respects,	then,	we	would	expect	a	greater	overlap	between	the	perceptual	and	cognitive	mechanisms	engaged	by	the	two	tasks.		We	had	the	same	set	of	hypotheses	and	used	the	same	basic	design	and	analysis	pipeline	as	in	Experiment	1,	all	of	which	we	pre-registered	in	advance	of	the	experiment	commencing	(https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=7yu6zf).		
	
Method		
Participants	
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Fifty-five	participants	took	part	in	this	experiment	for	monetary	compensation	or	course	credit.	All	participants	provided	informed	consent	and	had	normal	or	corrected-to-normal	vision.	Approval	was	obtained	from	the	Research	Ethics	and	Governance	Committee	of	the	School	of	Psychology	at	Bangor	University.	Participants	were	excluded	if	performance	was	2.5	standard	deviations	away	from	the	group	mean	in	terms	of	accuracy	on	the	working	memory	task	(N=5),	as	well	as	accuracy	(N=2)	or	reaction	time	on	the	SRC	task.	The	final	sample	included	48	participants	(15	males,	Meanage=24.90,	SDage=3.29,	age	range	=	21	to	39).	
	
Stimuli,	task,	and	procedure	The	tasks	used	in	Experiment	2	were	similar	to	Experiment	1	but	with	the	following	two	changes.	First,	we	calculated	an	imitative	compatibility	effect	independent	of	spatial	compatibility	in	the	SRC	task	(Catmur	&	Heyes,	2011).	To	do	so,	participants	viewed	an	image	of	an	index	or	middle	finger	lift	of	either	a	right	or	left	hand,	but	always	responded	with	their	right	hand.	Using	right	and	left-hand	images	produced	eight	trial	types	and	four	main	conditions	of	interest.	For	example,	when	cued	to	lift	their	index	finger	while	observing	a	left-hand	index	finger	lift,	the	observed	movement	is	both	imitatively	compatible	(same	finger),	as	well	as	spatially	compatible	(same	side	of	space	to	the	executed	movement).	In	contrast,	when	observing	a	right-hand	index	finger	lift,	the	participant’s	response	is	imitatively	compatible	(same	finger)	but	it	is	not	on	the	same	side	of	space	(they	are	spatially	incompatible).	Thus,	participants	performed	the	same	(imitatively	compatible)	or	different	(imitative	incompatible)	finger	movement	on	the	same	(spatially	compatible)	or	different	(spatially	incompatible)	side	of	space	to	the	observed	finger	movement,	giving	rise	to	the	following	four	conditions:	1. Imitatively	and	spatially	compatible	
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2. Imitatively	and	spatially	incompatible	3. Imitatively	compatible	and	spatially	incompatible	4. Imitatively	incompatible	and	spatially	compatible	Second,	we	used	face	stimuli	instead	of	letters	as	basis	for	a	load	manipulation	(Figure	1).	In	the	high	load	condition,	four	faces	were	presented	in	the	memory	set,	while	in	the	low	load	condition,	one	face	was	presented.	Faces	were	presented	in	a	circular	array	in	a	similar	manner	to	Experiment	1.	Participants	were	asked	to	remember	the	faces	during	the	retention	interval	and	then	respond	whether	the	memory	probe	face	stimulus	was	present	or	absent	in	the	memory	set	at	the	end	of	the	retention	interval.	Face	stimuli	included	20	female	faces	obtained	from	http://faceresearch.org	(DeBruine	&	Jones,	2017).		The	faces	were	edited	to	be	160	x	160	pixel	in	size,	were	presented	in	colour	and	modified	such	that	only	the	inner	face	(eyebrows,	eyes,	nose,	and	mouth)	was	shown	on	a	grey	background.			
Data	analysis	Data	were	analysed	in	an	identical	manner	to	Experiment	1,	except	we	performed	a	2	(Load:	low,	high)	x	2	(Spatial	Compatibility:	compatible,	incompatible)	x	2	(Imitative	Compatibility:	compatible,	incompatible)	repeated	measures	ANOVA	on	working	memory	accuracy,	as	well	as	SRC	accuracy	and	reaction	time.	Although	the	design,	data	and	hypotheses	remain	identical	to	those	that	we	pre-registered,	the	above	ANOVA	structure	is	subtly	different	to	one	that	we	pre-registered.	The	way	we	pre-registered	the	ANOVA	for	Experiments	2	and	3	is	intuitive	because	it	focussed	on	analysing	compatibility	type	(spatial	vs.	imitative)	as	a	function	of	load	and	compatibility.	However,	the	pre-registered	ANOVA	structure	could	be	criticised	on	the	grounds	that	some	factors,	which	are	treated	as	independent,	are	actually	not	independent.	Therefore,	
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in	Experiments	2	and	3,	we	choose	to	report	the	ANOVA	as	above	to	ensure	that	the	factors	are	treated	independently.	As	Experiment	1,	we	estimated	key	effect	sizes	by	calculating	reaction	time	compatibility	effects	as	a	function	of	compatibility	type	and	load.	The	spatial	compatibility	effect	was	calculated	by	subtracting	reaction	times	on	spatially	compatible	trials	from	spatially	incompatible	trials.	The	imitative	compatibility	effect	was	calculated	by	subtracting	reaction	times	on	imitatively	compatible	trials	from	imitatively	incompatible	trials.	Again,	these	analyses	were	driven	by	the	main	focus	of	the	research	question,	which	was	to	characterise	the	size	of	compatibility	effects	across	different	degrees	of	load.	
	
Results	Data	for	Experiment	2	are	visualised	in	Figure	3	and	effect	sizes	for	key	compatibility	effects	are	reported	in	Table	2.	Complete	statistical	information	on	the	ANOVAs	conducted	are	reported	in	Supplementary	Table	1.		
Working	memory		 Accuracy.	On	average,	all	conditions	were	above	chance	performance	as	demonstrated	by	the	95%	confidence	intervals	not	including	50%	(Figure	3A).	Further,	a	2	(Load:	low,	high)	x	2	(Spatial	Compatibility:	compatible,	incompatible)	x	2	(Imitative	Compatibility:	compatible,	incompatible)	repeated	measures	ANOVA	showed	a	main	effect	of	load	F(1,47)=1368.45,	p	<0.001,	h!" 	=	0.97.	The	effect	size	for	the	influence	of	load	was	large	and	in	the	expected	direction	such	that	accuracy	was	lower	in	the	high	than	low	load	conditions	(Figure	3A).	There	was	also	a	Spatial	Compatibility	*	Imitative	Compatibility	interaction	F(1,47)=6.42,	p	=0.02,	h!" 	=	0.12,	which	showed	that	the	imitative	compatibility	effect	(lower	accuracy	in	incompatible	than	compatible	
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conditions)	was	larger	at	spatially	incompatible	than	compatible	levels.	All	other	main	effects	and	interactions	were	not	significant	and	effect	sizes	were	close	to	zero	(Figure	3A;	Supplementary	Table	1).			
SRC	task		 Accuracy.	Average	accuracy	was	over	90%	in	all	conditions	(Figure	3B).	Further,	a	2	(Load:	low,	high)	x	2	(Spatial	Compatibility:	compatible,	incompatible)	x	2	(Imitative	Compatibility:	compatible,	incompatible)	repeated	measures	ANOVA	showed	a	main	effect	of	Spatial	Compatibility	F(1,47)=32.96,	p	<0.001,	h!" 	=	0.41	and	a	main	effect	of	Imitative	Compatibility	F(1,47)=36.98,	p	<0.001,	h!" 	=	0.44.	There	was	also	a	Spatial	Compatibility	*	Imitative	Compatibility	interaction	F(1,47)=5.33,	p	=0.03,	h!" 	=	0.10.	All	other	main	effects	and	interactions	were	not	significant	and	effect	sizes	were	close	to	zero	or	small	(Supplementary	Table	1).	The	effect	sizes	for	the	influence	of	both	spatial	and	imitative	compatibility	were	large	and	in	the	expected	direction	such	that	accuracy	was	lower	in	the	incompatible	than	compatible	conditions	(Figure	3B).	In	addition,	the	interaction	showed	that	the	imitative	compatibility	effect	was	larger	at	spatially	incompatible	than	compatible	levels.		 Reaction	time.	A	2	(Load:	low,	high)	x	2	(Spatial	Compatibility:	compatible,	incompatible)	x	2	(Imitative	Compatibility:	compatible,	incompatible)	repeated	measures	ANOVA	showed	a	main	effect	of	Spatial	Compatibility	F(1,47)=76.59,	p	<0.001,	
h!" 	=	0.62,	and	a	main	effect	of	Imitative	Compatibility	F(1,47)=30.08,	p	<0.001,	h!" 	=	0.39.		There	was	also	a	trend	towards	a	main	effect	of	load	F(1,47)=5.69,	p=0.08,	h!" 	=	0.07.	No	other	main	effects	or	interactions	were	significant	and	effect	sizes	were	close	to	zero	or	small	(Supplementary	Table	1).	Both	main	effects	of	Spatial	and	Imitative	
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compatibility	were	large	and	demonstrated	that	reaction	times	were	longer	in	incompatible	than	compatible	conditions	(Figure	3C).	The	trend	towards	a	main	effect	of	load	revealed	that	reaction	times	were	shorter	in	the	high	than	in	the	low	load	condition.		The	lack	of	interaction	between	load	and	either	type	of	compatibility	suggests	that	compatibility	effects	are	not	influenced	by	load.	To	interrogate	the	reaction	time	data	further,	we	estimated	effect	sizes	for	key	paired	contrasts.	These	paired	contrasts	demonstrated	that	compatibility	effects	are	present,	on	average,	across	all	compatibility	types	and	levels	of	load	with	effect	sizes	ranging	from	0.42	to	1.03	Cohen’s	dz	(Table	2).	In	addition,	and	consistent	with	prior	work	(Bertenthal	et	al.,	2006;	Boyer	et	al.,	2012;	Catmur	&	Heyes,	2011;	Darda	et	al.,	2018),	spatial	compatibility	effects	were	1.5-2	times	larger,	on	average,	than	imitative	compatibility	effects.		In	terms	of	our	key	hypothesis,	direct	comparison	of	compatibility	effects	between	high	and	low	load	revealed	that	there	was	not	even	a	trend	for	a	difference	in	the	predicted	direction	(i.e.,	high	>	low).	For	spatial	compatibility,	the	difference	between	high	and	low	load	was	small	or	close	to	zero	at	imitatively	compatible	(dz	=	0.14)	and	incompatible	levels	(dz	=	-0.10).	In	addition,	a	Bayesian	paired	samples	t-test	showed	that	the	null	was	over	2	or	10	times	more	likely	than	the	experimental	effect	at	imitatively	compatible	(BF01	=	2.47)	and	incompatible	levels	(BF01	=	10.24;	Table	2).	Likewise,	for	imitative	conflict,	the	difference	between	high	and	low	load	was	close	to	zero	at	spatially	compatible	(dz	=	0.06)	and	incompatible	levels	(dz	=	-0.17).	In	addition,	a	Bayesian	paired	samples	t-test	showed	that	the	null	was	over	4	or	12	times	more	likely	than	the	experimental	effect	at	spatially	compatible	(BF01	=	4.51)	and	incompatible	levels	(BF01	=	12.79;	Table	2).	In	summary,	spatial	and	imitative	compatibility	effects	were	present	at	low	and	high	levels	of	load,	but	in	both	cases	the	compatibility	effects	did	not	differ	as	a	function	of	load.	
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Discussion	Similar	to	Experiment	1,	we	found	no	influence	of	a	demanding	cognitive	load	task	on	automatic	imitation,	despite	clear	evidence	for	load	effects	and	for	both	imitative	and	spatial	compatibility	effects.	These	findings	held	in	spite	of	greater	overlap	between	the	type	of	material	used	in	the	working	memory	task	and	the	primary	task,	relative	to	Experiment	1.	The	findings,	therefore,	provide	further	evidence	that	the	cognitive	systems	that	support	imitative	tendencies	operate	in	a	relatively	automatic	manner,	which	is	robust	in	the	face	of	substantial	concurrent	demand	on	the	cognitive	resources	that	hold	faces	in	memory.		We	next	conducted	a	third	experiment	with	the	aims	of	further	confirming	our	findings,	and	of	bringing	the	demands	of	the	two	tasks	still	closer	together.	Even	though	faces	are	clearly	social	stimuli,	there	are	nonetheless	obvious	visual	feature	differences	between	faces	and	hand	actions.	As	such,	in	the	third	experiment,	we	loaded	working	memory	with	images	of	hands	holding	different	postures	so	that	the	overlap	of	the	content	of	the	two	tasks	was	essentially	complete.		The	third	experiment	also	permitted	one	unexpected	result	from	Experiment	2	to	be	evaluated	further.	The	SRC	task	had	an	influence	on	working	memory	performance,	such	that	a	lower	working	memory	accuracy	was	found	in	the	imitatively	incompatible	than	compatible	conditions	and	this	effect	was	larger	at	spatially	incompatible	than	compatible	levels.	Given	that	this	type	of	SRC	influence	on	working	memory	was	not	anticipated	and	there	was	no	impact	of	the	SRC	task	on	working	memory	performance	in	Experiment	1,	we	thought	that	further	evidence	was	required	before	we	provide	speculative	comments	on	this	effect.			
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Experiment	3	
Introduction	In	Experiment	3,	we	tested	the	efficiency	of	processes	controlling	automatic	imitation	when	the	contents	of	working	memory	load	are	matched	in	a	much	closer	manner	to	the	contents	of	the	main	task.	To	do	so,	we	used	hand	postures	as	load	stimuli.	Unlike	the	previous	two	experiments,	which	used	letters	and	faces,	hand	postures	have	essentially	identical	stimulus	features	as	the	stimuli	in	the	SRC	task.	Therefore,	if	independence	of	compatibility	effects	from	memory	load	is	again	observed,	it	would	be	impossible	to	claim	that	this	arose	due	to	the	stimuli	from	the	two	tasks	drawing	on	perceptual/memory	systems	that	are	differentiated	as	a	function	of	stimulus	material.	Again,	we	had	the	same	set	of	hypotheses	and	used	the	same	basic	design	and	analysis	pipeline	as	in	the	previous	experiments,	all	which	we	pre-registered	in	advance	of	the	experiment	commencing	(http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=863ek7).		
Method	
Participants	Fifty-nine	participants	took	part	in	this	experiment	for	monetary	compensation	or	course	credit.	All	participants	provided	informed	consent	and	had	normal	or	corrected-to-normal	vision.	Approval	was	obtained	from	the	Research	Ethics	and	Governance	Committee	of	the	School	of	Psychology	at	Bangor	University.	Participants	were	excluded	if	performance	was	2.5	standard	deviations	away	from	the	group	mean	average	performance	per	condition	in	terms	of	accuracy	on	the	working	memory	task	(N=2),	as	well	as	accuracy	(N=4)	or	reaction	time	(N=4)	on	the	SRC	task.	The	final	
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sample	included	49	participants	(12	males,	Meanage=20.80,	SDage=4.14,	age	range	=	18	to	42).	
	
Stimuli,	task,	and	procedure	The	tasks	used	in	Experiment	3	were	similar	to	Experiment	2	but	with	the	following	change:	we	used	hand	stimuli	instead	of	faces	as	the	basis	for	a	load	manipulation	(Figure	1).		In	the	high	load	condition,	four	hand	postures	were	presented	in	the	memory	set	in	a	circular	array,	while	in	the	low	load	condition,	one	hand	posture	was	presented.	Participants	were	asked	to	remember	the	hand	posture/s	during	the	retention	interval	and	then	respond	whether	the	memory	probe	hand	posture	stimulus	was	present	or	absent	in	the	memory	set	at	the	end	of	the	retention	interval.	The	20	hand	stimuli	depicted	20	different	single-hand	postures	typical	of	Indian	classical	dance	presented	from	the	same	frontal	viewpoint.	All	postures	were	demonstrated	by	a	single	female	actor	so	that	memory	performance	could	not	depend	on	variations	in	shape	or	texture	between	actors.	Participants	did	not	have	any	experience	with	Indian	classical	dance	and	were	not	familiar	with	the	hand	postures,	thus	making	the	stimuli	difficult	to	verbalise	or	subvocalise.		
	
Data	analysis	Data	analysis	procedures	were	identical	to	Experiment	2.	
	
Results	Data	for	Experiment	3	are	visualised	in	Figure	4	and	effect	sizes	for	key	compatibility	effects	are	reported	in	Table	2.	Complete	statistical	information	on	the	ANOVAs	conducted	are	reported	in	Supplementary	Table	1.	
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Working	memory		 Accuracy.	On	average,	performance	across	all	conditions	was	above	chance	performance	as	demonstrated	by	the	95%	confidence	intervals	not	including	50%	(Figure	4A).	Further,	a	2	(Load:	low,	high)	x	2	(Spatial	Compatibility:	compatible,	incompatible)	x	2	(Imitative	Compatibility:	compatible,	incompatible)	repeated	measures	ANOVA	showed	a	main	effect	of	load	F(1,48)=486.54,	p	<0.001,	h!" 	=	0.91.	All	other	main	effects	and	interactions	were	not	significant	and	effect	sizes	were	close	to	zero	or	small	(Supplementary	Table	1).	The	effect	size	for	the	influence	of	load	was	large	and	in	the	expected	direction	such	that	accuracy	was	lower	in	the	high	than	low	load	conditions	(Figure	4A).			
SRC	task		 Accuracy.	Mean	average	accuracy	was	over	or	approaching	90%	in	all	conditions	(Figure	4B).	Further,	a	2	(Load:	low,	high)	x	2	(Spatial	Compatibility:	compatible,	incompatible)	x	2	(Imitative	Compatibility:	compatible,	incompatible)	repeated	measures	ANOVA	showed	a	main	effect	of	Spatial	Compatibility	F(1,48)=46.08,	p	<0.001,	
h!"=	0.49	and	a	main	effect	of	Imitative	Compatibility	F(1,48)=9.40,	p	<0.004,	h!"=	0.16.	There	was	also	a	Spatial	Compatibility	*	Imitative	Compatibility	interaction	F(1,48)=5.44,	p	=0.024,	h!" 	=	0.10.	The	effect	sizes	for	the	influence	of	both	spatial	and	imitative	compatibility	were	large	and	in	the	expected	direction	such	that	accuracy	was	lower	in	the	incompatible	than	compatible	conditions.	In	addition,	the	interaction	between	compatibility	types	replicated	Experiment	2	and	showed	that	the	imitative	compatibility	effect	was	larger	at	spatially	incompatible	than	compatible	levels.	There	
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was	also	a	Load	*	Spatial	compatibility	interaction	F(1,48)=5.67,	p	=0.021,	h!" 	=	0.11,	which	showed	that	the	difference	in	accuracy	between	compatible	and	incompatible	conditions	was	greater	at	high	than	low	levels	of	load.	This	latter	interaction	effect	is	consistent	with	the	view	that	a	reduction	in	cognitive	control	may	lead	to	a	more	potent	impact	of	task-irrelevant	stimulus	features	and	thus	more	errors.	However,	the	effect	is	difficult	to	interpret	because	it	is	not	consistent	with	Experiment	2,	where	no	interaction	between	load	and	spatial	compatibility	was	observed	on	SRC	task	accuracy.	Moreover,	even	if	the	effect	was	consistent	across	experiments,	it	would	only	relate	to	understanding	automaticity	in	spatial	interference	control	and	not	the	control	of	imitation,	which	is	the	primary	focus	of	the	current	paper.	Therefore,	we	do	not	attempt	to	interpret	the	result	any	further.	All	other	main	effects	and	interactions	were	not	significant	and	effect	sizes	were	close	to	zero	(Supplementary	Table	1).		
Reaction	time.	A	2	(Load:	low,	high)	x	2	(Spatial	Compatibility:	compatible,	incompatible)	x	2	(Imitative	Compatibility:	compatible,	incompatible)	repeated	measures	ANOVA	showed	a	main	effect	of	Spatial	Compatibility	F(1,48)=98.20,	p	<0.001,	
h!" 	=	0.67	and	a	main	effect	of	Imitative	Compatibility	F(1,48)=12.72,	p	=	<0.001,	h!" 	=	0.21.	No	other	main	effects	or	interactions	were	significant	and	effect	sizes	were	close	to	zero	or	small	(Figure	4C;	Supplementary	Table	1).	One	of	the	small	effects	warrants	further	discussion	due	to	its	pertinence	to	the	primary	research	question.	The	Load	*	Imitative	compatibility	interaction	showed	a	non-significant	and	small	effect	(h!" 	=	0.03)	in	the	hypothesised	direction,	such	that	imitative	compatibility	was	marginally	larger	in	the	high	than	low	load	condition.	Although	this	is	a	small	effect,	which	our	study	was	not	designed	to	detect	with	reasonable	confidence	(>80%	statistical	power),	given	the	pertinence	to	our	primary	question,	we	evaluate	it	further	below	using	paired	contrasts	to	estimate	effect	sizes	further.	
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The	lack	of	a	clear	interaction	effect	between	load	and	either	type	of	compatibility	suggests	that	compatibility	effects	remain	largely	unaffected	by	load.	To	interrogate	the	reaction	time	data	further,	we	estimated	effect	sizes	for	key	paired	contrasts.	These	paired	contrasts	demonstrated	that	compatibility	effects	are	present,	on	average,	across	all	compatibility	types	and	levels	of	load	with	effect	sizes	ranging	from	0.20	to	0.92	Cohen’s	dz	(Table	2).	In	addition,	consistent	with	findings	from	Experiment	2	and	prior	work	(Bertenthal	et	al.,	2006;	Boyer	et	al.,	2012;	Catmur	&	Heyes,	2011;	Darda	et	al.,	2018),	spatial	compatibility	effects	were	several	times	larger,	on	average,	than	imitative	compatibility	effects.		In	terms	of	our	key	hypothesis,	direct	comparison	of	compatibility	effects	between	high	and	low	load	revealed	that	there	was	not	convincing	evidence	for	a	difference	in	the	predicted	direction	(i.e.,	high	>	low).	For	spatial	compatibility,	the	difference	between	high	and	low	load	was	close	to	zero	at	imitatively	compatible	(dz	=	-0.07)	and	incompatible	levels	(dz	=	-0.06).	In	addition,	a	Bayesian	paired	samples	t-test	showed	that	the	null	was	8	or	9	times	more	likely	than	the	experimental	effect	at	imitatively	compatible	(BF01	=	9.17)	and	incompatible	levels	(BF01	=	8.68;	Table	2).	Likewise,	for	imitative	conflict,	the	difference	between	high	and	low	load	was	small	at	spatially	compatible	(dz	=	0.15)	and	incompatible	levels	(dz	=	0.12)	and	95%	confidence	interval	estimates	overlapped	with	zero.	In	addition,	a	Bayesian	paired	samples	t-test	showed	that	the	null	was	over	2	or	3	times	more	likely	than	the	experimental	effect	at	spatially	compatible	(BF01	=	2.34)	and	incompatible	levels	(BF01	=	3.02;	Table	2).	Therefore,	although	the	imitative	compatibility	effect	was	numerically	larger	under	high	than	low	load,	the	effect	remained	small	and	relatively	inconsistent	with	the	null	effect	being	several	times	more	likely	than	the	experimental	effect.	In	summary,	spatial	and	imitative	compatibility	effects	were	present	at	low	and	high	levels	of	load,	but	in	both	
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cases,	there	was	no	clear	evidence	that	compatibility	effects	differed	as	a	function	of	load.			
Discussion	Similar	to	Experiments	1	and	2,	we	found	no	clear	influence	of	a	demanding	cognitive	load	task	on	automatic	imitation,	despite	clear	load	effects	on	working	memory,	as	well	as	clear	imitative	and	spatial	compatibility	effects.	This	finding	held	even	though	the	content	used	for	the	two	tasks	was	essentially	identical	in	nature.	The	findings	from	the	third	experiment,	therefore,	confirm	that	the	cognitive	systems	behind	imitative	tendencies	operate	in	a	relatively	efficient	manner,	which	is	independent	of	central	cognitive	resources.	
	
General	Discussion		Over	three	experiments,	we	replicated	expected	stimulus-response	compatibility	effects	and	central	working	memory	load	effects.	In	none	of	these	experiments,	however,	did	we	find	convincing	evidence	for	an	influence	of	central	load	on	the	size	of	the	compatibility	effects.	Experiments	2	and	3	confirmed	this	pattern	separately	for	spatial	and	imitative	compatibility	effects.	Further,	the	same	pattern	held	across	a	range	of	types	of	visual	material	used	in	the	working	memory	task	(letters,	faces	and	hand	postures).	This	demonstrates	that	the	robustness	of	imitation	effects	in	the	presence	of	load	did	not	depend	on	the	content	held	in	working	memory	nor	on	its	similarity	to	the	action	stimuli.		As	tested	here	using	SRC	measures,	the	tendency	to	imitate	others’	actions	is	not	modulated	by	the	presence	of	a	demonstrably	difficult	cognitive	load.	Therefore,	in	the	sense	of	persisting	in	the	presence	of	cognitive	load,	this	type	of	imitation	behaviour	can	
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be	considered	automatic.	Before	further	considering	the	implications	of	these	findings	for	understanding	the	cognitive	processes	that	support	automatic	imitation,	we	first	consider	alternative	interpretations	and	limitations	of	our	findings.		
Possible	alternative	interpretations		One	possibility	when	demonstrating	a	lack	of	interaction	is	that	the	load	manipulation	was	ineffective.	However,	this	is	unlikely	given	that	the	manipulation	of	cognitive	load	produced	large	effect	sizes	on	working	memory	performance.	A	related	concern	is	that	the	load	task	is	so	effective	that	working	memory	performance	in	the	high	load	condition	is	not	distinguishable	from	chance.	In	that	event,	it	could	be	that	participants	essentially	gave	up	on	those	trials,	which	might	render	them	more	like	low-load	trials	and	thus	explain	the	lack	of	difference	between	load	conditions.	However,	this	was	not	the	case.	Performance	on	high	load	conditions	was	above	chance	(on	average)	across	all	three	experiments.	Furthermore,	in	all	three	experiments,	when	we	removed	individuals	with	performance	in	the	high	load	condition	that	approached	chance	(<	55%),	the	pattern	of	results	remained	largely	the	same	(Supplementary	Tables	2	and	3).	We	acknowledge	that	in	Experiment	3,	this	secondary	analysis	was	based	on	a	relatively	small	subsample	of	participants	(n=13),	which	reduces	our	sensitivity	to	detect	effects,	but	nonetheless,	based	on	evidence	across	all	three	experiments,	there	remained	no	compelling	or	consistent	evidence	for	an	effect	of	load	on	compatibility	effects.		A	further	consideration	is	that	a	lack	of	evidence	for	an	interaction	reflects	a	lack	of	sensitivity.	There	are	grounds	that	make	this	unlikely.	We	used	a	high-power	design,	which	provided	80%	power	to	detect	effects	that	are	typically	considered	small	to	medium	(Cohen’s	dz	0.35	and	above).	Even	in	Experiments	2	and	3,	where,	after	excluding	outliers,	the	final	sample	dipped	below	our	target	of	N=50,	we	still	had	80%	
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power	to	detect	small	to	medium	effect	sizes	(Cohen’s	dz	0.36	and	above).	Moreover,	we	replicated	the	same	pattern	of	effects	in	three	separate	experiments.	Therefore,	we	are	relatively	confident	that	if	an	effect	of	load	existed,	which	was	in	the	range	of	Cohen’s	dz	0.35-0.36	or	higher,	we	would	have	been	able	to	detect	it.		Consistent	with	recent	recommendations	(Cumming,	2012;	Gigerenzer,	2018),	explicitly	considering	the	sensitivity	of	our	design	and	interpreting	effect	sizes,	rather	than	simply	making	binary	distinctions	based	on	a	p	value	criterion	(e.	g.,	p	<	0.05),	has	important	implications	for	the	type	of	conclusion	that	we	can	make.	Indeed,	based	on	the	power	of	our	experimental	design,	we	cannot	rule	out	the	possibility	that	cognitive	load	has	a	small	effect	on	SRC	measures	of	automatic	imitation,	but	we	can	suggest	with	some	confidence	that	medium	and	large	effects	are	unlikely.	Based	on	our	findings,	therefore,	the	best	current	estimate	is	that	cognitive	load	has	a	near-zero	effect	on	SRC	measures	of	automatic	imitation	with	the	caveat	that	small	effects	of	load	remain	a	possibility.	Future	work	using	considerably	more	powerful	designs,	which,	for	example,	would	require	hundreds	of	participants	per	experiment,	would	be	needed	to	confidently	conclude	that	small	effects	of	load	are	also	unlikely.	In	sum,	the	implication	for	theories	of	imitation	is	that	we	can	be	relatively	confident	that	the	systems	supporting	automatic	imitation	are	largely	indifferent	to	cognitive	load	and	operate	in	a	relatively	automatic	manner.		A	final	logical	possibility	is	that	the	type	of	SRC	task	used	has	a	ceiling	effect	–	that	is,	that	there	is	some	inherent	limit	to	the	extent	to	which	RTs	can	be	slowed	on	incompatible	trials	or	facilitated	on	compatible	trials.	In	that	case,	we	would	not	be	able	to	test	our	prediction	of	an	increased	imitative	compatibility	effect	driven	by	central	cognitive	load.	Contrary	to	this	proposal,	however,	prior	work	shows	that	the	SRC	task	can	be	modulated	by	several	factors	such	as	situations	that	promote	affiliation	through	
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eye	contact	(Wang,	Newport,	&	Hamilton,	2010),	group	membership	(Gleibs,	Wilson,	Reddy,	&	Catmur,	2016),	and	facial	expressions	(Butler,	Ward,	&	Ramsey,	2016),	as	well	as	when	interacting	with	more	human-like,	rather	than	robotic,	agents	(Kilner	et	al.,	2003;	Klapper	et	al.,	2014;	Press,	2011).	Other	work	has	shown	that	when	prosocial	attitudes	are	generated	(Cook	&	Bird,	2011;	Leighton,	Bird,	Orsini,	&	Heyes,	2010),	or	prosocial	gestures	are	signalled	(Cracco,	Genschow,	Radkova,	&	Brass,	2018),	imitation	increases.	Also,	across	our	current	experiments,	the	absolute	size	of	the	SRC	effect	is	variable,	which	further	suggests	that	it	can	be	moved	by	other	manipulations.	As	such,	it	does	seem	that	in	a	variety	of	contexts	the	size	of	the	SRC	effect	can	be	modulated.		 	
Implications	for	understanding	the	cognitive	bases	of	automatic	imitation	The	current	results	develop	our	understanding	of	automaticity	in	the	cognitive	systems	that	underpin	spontaneous	copying	behaviours.	Indeed,	the	findings	complement	prior	work	that	shows	automatic	imitation	is	unintentional	(e.g.,	Brass	et	al.,	2000)	and	work	that	shows	that	automatic	imitation	is	influenced	by	beliefs	and	task	orientation	(Gowen	et	al.,	2016;	Klapper	et	al.,	2014;	Liepelt	&	Brass,	2010;	Longo	&	Berthenthal,	2009;	Stanley	et	al.,	2007;	Bach	et	al.,	2007;	Chong	et	al.,	2009).	Here	we	add	an	extra	dimension	to	the	understanding	of	automaticity	in	imitation.	In	the	sense	of	persisting	in	the	presence	of	cognitive	load,	this	type	of	imitation	behaviour	can	be	considered	automatic.	That	is,	the	cognitive	operations	that	generate	and/or	control	imitative	tendencies	operate	the	same	whether	or	not	a	central	resource	is	taxed	heavily.	Therefore,	in	keeping	with	proposals	to	move	beyond	a	strictly	“two-systems”	view	of	automaticity	(Bargh,	1989;	1994;	Melnikoff	&	Bargh,	2018;	Moors	&	De	Houwer,	2006),	the	present	work	helps	to	show	how	imitative	processes	can	exhibit	automatic	features	(unintentional,	efficient),	as	well	as	controlled	features	(top-down	influences).	
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Future	research	should	probe,	more	specifically,	which	components	of	imitation	exhibit	automatic	functionality.	For	example,	the	task	used	in	the	current	study	measures	a	composite	of	the	urge	to	imitate,	as	well	as	the	control	of	this	urge.	Therefore,	in	theory,	automaticity	could	be	apparent	at	one	or	both	of	these	levels,	and	both	are	of	interest	when	attempting	to	understand	mechanisms	of	social	cognition.	There	are	at	least	two	distinct	cognitive	structures	that	could	account	for	these	results,	which	future	research	should	investigate	further.	First,	a	“social-is-special”	account	would	suggest	that	hand	movements	and	other	social	signals	are	processed	through	a	specialised	channel.	Under	such	an	account,	conflict	between	cues	would	influence	behaviour	without	(or	only	minimally)	drawing	on	any	systems	that	maintain	visual	information	in	working	memory.	This	structure	would	be	consistent	with	a	domain-specific	view	of	control	in	automatic	imitation	(Brass	et	al.,	2009).		In	contrast,	a	second	"nothing-is-special"	account	suggests	that	social	and	non-social	response	conflict,	at	least	as	measured	here,	are	managed	by	a	domain-general	system	that	shares	little	in	common	with	the	system	that	retains	stimuli	in	working	memory	for	later	retrieval.	This	is	consistent	with	evidence	that	shows	storage	and	control	processes	rely	on	partly	dissociable	cognitive	and	neural	structures	(Baddeley,	2012;	D’Esposito	et	al.,	1995;	Miller	&	Cohen,	2001;	Repovs	&	Baddeley,	2006;	Smith	&	Jonides,	1999).	In	addition,	a	domain-general	view	of	selection	and	control	can	easily	account	for	the	results	observed	in	Experiments	2	and	3,	whereby	similar	effects	of	load	were	observed	on	two	different	types	of	conflict	(spatial	and	imitative).	Such	findings	are	also	consistent	with	recent	neuroimaging	studies,	which	demonstrated	that	a	common	frontoparietal	brain	circuit	is	involved	in	resolving	both	spatial	and	imitative	conflict	(Cross,	Torrisi,	Reynolds	Losin,	&	Iacoboni,	2013;	Darda	et	al.,	2018).	Importantly,	future	work	is	required	to	directly	test	between	these	two	accounts	of	the	
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cognitive	structure	that	underpins	how	automatic	imitation	effects	persist	under	high	cognitive	load.	Under	either	account,	however,	the	results	show	that	imitative	tendencies	function	automatically	in	the	sense	that	they	draw	minimally	or	not	at	all	on	central	executive	resources,	as	instantiated	in	the	working	memory	task	that	we	used.	Of	course,	it	remains	possible	that	automatic	imitation	can	be	influenced	by	load	manipulations	that	tax	different	aspects	of	central	processing	resources,	a	possibility	that	should	be	explored	in	future	studies	in	order	to	test	the	extent	to	which	our	findings	generalise	across	different	components	of	executive	control.	Several	other	lines	of	research	provide	important	context	for	the	current	findings.	Similar	cognitive	load	manipulations	do	impact	other	conflict	tasks	–	both	social	and	non-social.	Therefore,	it	is	not	the	case	that	all	types	of	conflict	can	resist	cognitive	load	(Lavie,	2005;	2010).	For	example,	maintaining	an	array	of	letters	in	working	memory	(similar	to	Experiment	1),	produces	increased	interference	in	a	conflict	task	that	involves	detecting	a	target	letter	in	the	presence	of	a	peripheral	distractor	letter	(Konstantinou	et	al.,	2014).	Therefore,	it	appears	that	when	working	memory	is	loaded	with	content	(e.g.,	letters)	that	is	also	required	during	a	conflict	task,	an	effect	of	load	is	observed	(de	Fockert	et	al.,	2001).	In	the	present	study,	however,	the	results	were	different.	Even	in	Experiment	3,	when	the	content	of	working	memory	storage	was	identical	(hand	postures)	to	the	content	of	the	conflict	task	(hand	movements),	conflict	remained	unaffected	by	load.	Conversely,	other	dimensions	of	social	cognition	also	show	resistance	to	cognitive	load	manipulations.	Interference	effects	in	other	social	SRC	tasks	persist	in	the	presence	of	load,	such	as	in	gaze-cueing	(Hayward	&	Ristic,	2013;	Law,	Langton,	&	Logie,	2010)	and	level-1	visual	perspective	taking	tasks	(Qureshi,	Apperly,	&	Samson,	2010).	In	contrast,	however,	interference	does	not	persist	under	load	during	implicit	false	belief	
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tracking;	instead,	under	higher	load,	belief	tracking	reduces	(Schneider,	Lam,	Bayliss,	&	Dux,	2012).	These	findings	offer	two	implications.	First,	a	domain-general	control	network,	which	is	efficient	and	operates	with	many	different	inputs,	such	as	imitation	(hands/actions),	social	attention	(eye	gaze)	and	perspective	taking	(head	orientation	and	line	of	sight)	may	operate	in	social	cognition.	Second,	belief	reasoning	may	engage	a	partially	separate	mechanism	to	the	above	social	and	cognitive	processes,	which	relies	on	a	separate	system	that	encompasses	more	elaborate	resources,	which	do	not	persist	under	load.	As	such,	these	studies	may	point	towards	a	signature	limit	to	controlling	social	processes.		A	final	literature,	which	contextualises	our	findings	further,	is	work	showing	that	other	“automatic”	social	cognitive	processes	are	subject	to	modulation,	including	by	concurrent	cognitive	load.	For	example,	studies	have	shown	that	increasing	cognitive	load	will	increase	the	reliance	on	stereotypes	in	encoding	or	recalling	personal	information	(Macrae,	Hewstone,	&	Griffiths,	1993;	Stangor	and	Duan,	1991).	More	specifically,	Gilbert	and	Hixon	(1991)	distinguish	effects	of	cognitive	load	on	activating	versus	applying	stereotypes.	Therefore,	there	may	yet	be	social	situations	where	imitative	tendencies	are	influenced	by	concurrent	cognitive	load,	thus	mirroring	work	on	stereotype	activation.	Indeed,	as	argued	previously,	future	research	should	consider	social	context	and	social	factors	more	generally	when	attempting	to	characterise	imitative	processes	and	functions	(Over	&	Carpenter,	2012).	The	present	results	along	with	previous	findings	point	towards	a	factorial	combination	of	three	major	dimensions	that	future	studies	may	explore	in	depth.	Specifically,	future	studies	should	systematically	manipulate	the	amount	(low	or	high)	and	type	(perceptual	or	cognitive)	of	load	and	their	effects	on	a	variety	of	conflict	tasks	(social	and	non-social).	By	doing	so,	the	results	may	reveal	general	principles	that	
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govern	the	operation	of	cognitive	mechanisms	across	domains,	as	well	as	within	domains,	and	therefore	help	to	adjudicate	between	the	two	general	frameworks	outlined	above	(social-is-special	vs.	nothing-is-special).			
Conclusion			It	has	been	claimed	that	social	interactions	are	governed	in	important	ways	by	relatively	automatic	cognitive	processes,	such	as	those	that	underpin	imitative	tendencies	(Dijksterhuis	&	Bargh,	2001;	Heyes,	2011).	To	date,	however,	little	is	known	about	the	structure	of	such	automatic	processes,	as	well	as	how	they	may	operate	in	social	cognition.	Here	we	provide	richer	detail	on	the	nature	of	such	automaticity	by	demonstrating	that	imitative	tendencies	remain	unaffected	under	a	demonstrably	difficult	cognitive	load.	Indeed,	the	cognitive	operations	that	generate	imitative	tendencies	are	relatively	efficient	in	that	they	operate	the	same	whether	or	not	a	central	resource	is	taxed	heavily.	Therefore,	in	the	sense	of	persisting	in	the	presence	of	cognitive	load,	this	type	of	imitation	behaviour	can	be	considered	automatic.	Taken	together	with	prior	findings,	the	current	work	provides	empirical	support	for	proposals	that	move	beyond	a	strictly	“two-systems”	view	of	automaticity	(Bargh,	1989;	1994;	Melnikoff	&	Bargh,	2018;	Moors	&	De	Houwer,	2006),	by	showing	how	imitative	processes	can	exhibit	automatic	features	(unintentional,	efficient),	as	well	as	controlled	features	(top-down	influences).		 	
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Table	1.	Paired	contrasts	effect	sizes	for	reaction	time	data	in	Experiment	1.		
Experiment	and	Condition	 Compatibility	effect	
Milliseconds	
[95%	CI]	
Cohen’s	dz	
	
BF01	
Exp.	1	 	 	 	
General	compatibility		 	 	 	Low	load		 72.57	[59.60,	∞]	 1.29 	High	load	 67.57	[58.59,	∞]	 1.73 	High	–	Low	load	 -5.00	[-15.07,	∞]	 -0.11 11.44		
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Table	2.		Paired	contrasts	effect	sizes	for	reaction	time	data	in	Experiments	2	and	3.		
Condition		 Experiment	2	 Experiment	3	
Compatibility	effect	 Compatibility	effect		 Milliseconds	
[95%	CI]	
Cohen’s	dz	
	
BF01	 Milliseconds	
[95%	CI]	
Cohen’s	dz	
	
BF01	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Spatial	compatibility	
(imitatively	compatible)	
	 	 	 	 	 	Low	load		 37.70	[28.72,	∞]	 1.02	 	 35.05	[25.87,	∞]	 0.92	 	High	load	 43.75	[33.47,	∞]	 1.03	 	 31.68	[22.98,	∞]	 0.87	 	High	–	Low	load	 6.05	[-4.38,	∞]	 0.14	 2.47	 -3.36	[-14.37,	∞]	 -0.07	 9.17	
Spatial	compatibility	
(imitative	incompatible)	 	 	 	 	 	 	Low	load		 40.96	[28.69,	∞]	 0.81	 	 33.77	[24.41,	∞]	 0.87	 	High	load	 35.63	[24.67,	∞]	 0.79	 	 30.31	[17.98,	∞]	 0.87	 	High	–	Low	load	 -5.33	[-17.80,	∞]	 -0.10	 10.24	 -3.46	[-17.13,	∞]	 -0.06	 8.68		 	 	 	 	 	 	
Imitative	compatibility	
(spatially	compatible)	
	 	 	 	 	 	Low	load		 24.59	[13.86,	∞]	 0.56	 	 9.04	[1.74,	∞]	 0.30	 	High	load	 27.68	[18.62,	∞]	 0.74	 	 15.45	[3.70,	∞]	 0.32	 	High	–	Low	load	 3.09	[-9.61,	∞]	 0.06	 4.51	 6.41	[-4.09,	∞]	 0.15	 2.34	
Imitative	compatibility	
(spatially	incompatible)	 	 	 	 	 	 	Low	load		 19.56	[8.23,	∞]	 0.42	 	 7.76	[-1.70,	∞]	 0.20	 	High	load	 27.85	[15.36,	∞]	 0.54	 	 14.07	[3.98,	∞]	 0.33	 	High	–	Low	load	 -8.29	[-20.40,	∞]	 -0.17	 12.79	 6.31	[-6.79,	∞]	 0.12	 3.02	
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Figure	1.	Experimental	design	and	stimuli	across	each	experiment.		
	
Figure	1.	Experimental	design	and	stimuli	across	each	experiment.	Each	experiment	had	the	same	basic	structure.	First,	there	was	a	set	of	stimuli	to	be	held	in	memory,	which	could	either	be	a	single	item	(low	load)	or	multiple	items	(high	load).	Whilst	keeping	this	working	memory	content	in	mind	for	later	verification,	participants	performed	a	stimulus	response	compatibility	task	(SRC	Task),	which	consisted	of	finger-lifting	movement	observation	and	execution.	As	such,	the	observed	finger	movement	could	be	compatible	or	incompatible	to	the	performed	finger	movement	with	the	imperative	cue	(a	“1”	or	“2”)	being	independent	to	any	observed	finger	movement.	Following	the	SRC	task,	a	target	appeared	and	participants	had	to	verify	whether	the	item	was	part	of	the	stimuli	presented	at	the	start	of	the	trial.	Across	Experiments	1	to	3,	we	used	letters,	faces	and	hand	postures	as	stimuli	to	hold	in	working	memory.		
	 	
Low load High load Target
Exp. 1
SRC Task
Exp. 2 Image needed
Exp. 3
W
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Figure	2.	Results	for	Experiment	1.		A.	Working	memory	accuracy	(%)								 				B.	SRC	task	accuracy	(%)	 	 							 					C.	SRC	task	reaction	time	(ms) 
	
Figure	2.	Results	for	Experiment	1.	Working	memory	accuracy	(A)	and	SRC	task	accuracy	(B)	reported	in	%	correct	and	SRC	task		reaction	time	(C)	reported	in	miliseconds	across	conditions	of	general	compatibiltity	and	load.	Black	bars	show	mean	average	group	performance,	with	grey	markers	showing	individual	participant	data	points.	Abbreviations:	SRC	=	stimulus	response	compatibility;	RT	=	reaction	time;	ms	=	miliseconds.	Error	bars	are	95%	confidence	intervals.	
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Figure	3.	Results	for	Experiment	2.	A.	Working	memory	accuracy	(%)	 	 					B.	SRC	task	accuracy	(%)	 	 	 									C.	SRC	task	reaction	time	(ms)	
	
Figure	3.	Results	for	Experiment	2.	Working	memory	accuracy	(A)	and	SRC	task	accuracy	(B)	reported	in	%	correct	and	SRC	task		reaction	time	(C)	reported	in	miliseconds	across	conditions	of	spatial	and	imitative	compatibiltity	as	well	as	load.	Black	bars	show	mean	average	group	performance,	with	grey	markers	showing	individual	participant	data	points.Abbreviations:	SRC	=	stimulus	response	compatibility;	RT	=	reaction	time;	ms	=	miliseconds.	Error	bars	are	95%	confidence	intervals.	
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Figure	4.	Results	for	Experiment	3.	
		 A.	Working	memory	accuracy	(%)		 	 			B.	SRC	task	accuracy	(%)	 	 	 									C.	SRC	task	reaction	time	(ms)	
	
Figure	4.	Results	for	Experiment	3.	Working	memory	accuracy	(A)	and	SRC	task	accuracy	(B)	reported	in	%	correct	and	SRC	task		reaction	time	(C)	reported	in	miliseconds	across	conditions	of	spatial	and	imitative	compatibiltity	as	well	as	load.	Black	bars	show	mean	average	group	performance,	with	grey	markers	showing	individual	participant	data	points.Abbreviations:	SRC	=	stimulus	response	compatibility;	RT	=	reaction	time;	ms	=	miliseconds.	Error	bars	are	95%	confidence	intervals.	
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Supplementary	Table	1.	Complete	ANOVA	information	for	Experiments	2	and	3.	
Dependent	measure	and	ANOVA	factor	 Experiment	2	 Experiment	3	
df	 F	 p	 h!"	 df	 F	 p	 h!"	
Working	memory	accuracy	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Load	 1,	47	 1368.45	 <0.001	 0.97	 1,	48	 486.54	 <0.001	 0.91	Spatial	Compatibility	 1,	47	 0.45	 0.50	 0.01	 1,	48	 0.61	 0.44	 0.01	Imitative	Compatibility	 1,	47	 0.93	 0.34	 0.02	 1,	48	 0.06	 0.81	 <0.01	Load	*	Spatial	Compatibility	 1,	47	 0.04	 0.85	 <0.01	 1,	48	 1.65	 0.21	 0.03	Load	*	Imitative	Compatibility	 1,	47	 0.67	 0.42	 0.01	 1,	48	 0.03	 0.87	 <0.01	Spatial	Compatibility	*	Imitative	Compatibility	 1,	47	 6.42	 0.02	 0.12	 1,	48	 0.10	 0.75	 <0.01	Load	*	Spatial	Compatibility	*	Imitative	Compatibility	 1,	47	 0.26	 0.61	 0.01	 1,	48	 0.03	 0.87	 <0.01		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
SRC	accuracy	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Load	 1,	47	 1.19	 0.28	 0.03	 1,	48	 0.03	 0.86	 <0.01	Spatial	Compatibility	 1,	47	 32.96	 <0.001	 0.41	 1,	48	 46.08	 <0.001	 0.49	Imitative	Compatibility	 1,	47	 36.98	 <0.001	 0.44	 1,	48	 9.40	 0.00	 0.16	Load	*	Spatial	Compatibility	 1,	47	 1.01	 0.32	 0.02	 1,	48	 5.67	 0.02	 0.11	Load	*	Imitative	Compatibility	 1,	47	 0.02	 0.89	 <0.01	 1,	48	 0.34	 0.56	 0.01	Spatial	Compatibility	*	Imitative	Compatibility	 1,	47	 5.33	 0.03	 0.10	 1,	48	 5.44	 0.02	 0.10	Load	*	Spatial	Compatibility	*	Imitative	Compatibility	 1,	47	 0.02	 0.89	 <0.01	 1,	48	 0.01	 0.93	 <0.01		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
SRC	reaction	time	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Load	 1,	47	 3.30	 0.08	 0.07	 1,	48	 1.98	 0.17	 0.04	Spatial	Compatibility	 1,	47	 76.59	 <0.001	 0.62	 1,	48	 98.20	 <0.001	 0.67	Imitative	Compatibility	 1,	47	 30.08	 <0.001	 0.39	 1,	48	 12.72	 <0.001	 0.21	Load	*	Spatial	Compatibility	 1,	47	 0.01	 0.93	 <0.01	 1,	48	 0.38	 0.54	 0.01	Load	*	Imitative	Compatibility	 1,	47	 0.27	 0.61	 0.01	 1,	48	 1.57	 0.22	 0.03	Spatial	Compatibility	*	Imitative	Compatibility	 1,	47	 0.18	 0.68	 <0.01	 1,	48	 0.04	 0.84	 <0.01	Load	*	Spatial	Compatibility	*	Imitative	Compatibility	 1,	47	 1.11	 0.30	 0.02	 1,	48	 <0.001	 0.99	 <0.01	
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Supplementary	Table	2.	Reaction	time	data	in	the	SRC	task	during	Experiment	1	excluding	participants	with	less	than	55%	performance	in	the	working	memory	task.	
	
Experiment	and	Condition	 Compatibility	effect		
Milliseconds	
[95%	CI]	
Cohen’s	dz	
	
BF01	
Exp.	1	(N=48)	 	 	 	
General	compatibility		 	 	 	Low	load		 70.36	[56.33,	∞]	 1.22 	High	load	 64.55	[55.64,	∞]	 1.75 	High	–	Low	load	 -5.81	[-16.77,	∞]	 -0.13 11.24	
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Supplementary	Table	3.	Reaction	time	data	in	the	SRC	task	during	Experiments	2	and	3	excluding	participants	with	less	than	55%	performance	in	the	working	memory	task.	
Experiment	and	Condition	 Experiment	2	(N=26)	 Experiment	3	(N=13)	
Compatibility	effect	 Compatibility	effect		 Milliseconds	
[95%	CI]	
Cohen’s	dz	
	
BF01	 Milliseconds	
[95%	CI]	
Cohen’s	dz	
	
BF01	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Spatial	compatibility	
(imitatively	compatible)	
	 	 	 	 	 	Low	load		 38.31	[25.75,	∞]	 1.02	 	 40.77	[25.61,	∞]	 1.33	 	High	load	 51.84	[37.13,	∞]	 1.18	 	 39.01	[19.10,	∞]	 0.97	 	High	–	Low	load	 13.53	[1.54,	∞]	 0.38	 0.51	 -1.77	[-26.78,	∞]	 -0.04	 3.93	
Spatial	compatibility	
(imitative	incompatible)	 	 	 	 	 	 	Low	load		 42.09	[25.38,	∞]	 0.84	 	 31.59	[10.88,	∞]	 0.75	 	High	load	 32.42	[16.89,	∞]	 0.70	 	 19.91	[-12.96,	∞]	 0.30	 	High	–	Low	load	 -9.67	[-27.63,	∞]	 -0.18	 8.51	 -11.68	[-39.50,	∞]	 -2.10	 5.68		 	 	 	 	 	 	
Imitative	compatibility	
(spatially	compatible)	
	 	 	 	 	 	Low	load		 26.85	[11.88,	∞]	 0.60	 	 16.19	[-3.52,	∞]	 0.41	 	High	load	 31.83	[19.43,	∞]	 0.86	 	 32.11	[3.48,	∞]	 0.55	 	High	–	Low	load	 4.98	[-10.25,	∞]	 0.11	 2.98	 15.92	[-6.81,	∞]	 0.35	 1.09	
Imitative	compatibility	
(spatially	incompatible)	 	 	 	 	 	 	Low	load		 30.64	[12.38,	∞]	 0.42	 	 7.00	[-15.42,	∞]	 0.15	 	High	load	 12.42	[-3.64,	∞]	 0.26	 	 13.00	[-7.16,	∞]	 0.32	 	High	–	Low	load	 -18.22	[-37.53,	∞]	 -0.32	 11.40	 6.01	[-21.29,	∞]	 0.11	 2.63	
	
